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Out of Sight in Morocco, or How to See the Jinn in the Modern-day Museum 
Simon O’Meara 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language 
and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Abstract: This essay explores Dale Eickelman’s counter-intuitive insight that seeing in the 
modern-day museum is something that needs teaching. Exploring this pedagogical 
desideratum in the cultural context to which it pertains, namely, Islamic culture, the essay 
highlights the extent to which the modern-day museum strives for absolute visibility and 
shows how this aspiration sits awkwardly with Islamic culture, which is as much about 
invisibility as visibility. Responding to a recent challenge in visual anthropology that scholars 
should try to build a knowledge of their subject from a place of the quranic al-ghayb (the 
unknown, or invisible), the essay first grapples with the museological display of Islamic art 
from the place of the mostly invisible jinn. Second, it explores the extent to which the 
modern-day museum is embedded within a wider urban culture wed to a desire for total 
visibility and a certain type of pictoriality. This modern Western visuality, the essay suggests, 
is in many ways the opposite of Islamic visuality. 
As anyone who has witnessed Dale Eickelman working in Morocco will tell you, he does not 
stand apart from his interlocutors, but fits right in. To the extent that it is possible, he closes 
the gap between observer and observed; not by imitation and costume, but empathy and the 
absence of all superiority. Remaining in plain sight, he yet disappears. Often he does so while 
pursuing his interests in aspects of the country that are themselves hidden from view, the 
cloak of power having rendered them invisible; for example, the operations of the king’s 
bureaucracy, the Makhzan. Taking my cue from these interests and modus operandi of his, I 
propose to explore further the issue of invisibility by centring my paper about the 
disappearing jinn. I shall investigate the jinn’s resistance to the space and representational 
system of the modern-day museum, which developed in Europe in the nineteenth century. 
Whereas Eickelman is an out of sight anthropologist to those with eyes to see, to the modern-
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day museum the jinn are not just out of sight but not even in the picture. How, then, to see 
the jinn there? 
 
How to see in museums 
In the President’s Newsletter of December 2017 for the Tangier American Legation 
Institute for Moroccan Studies (TALIM), Eickelman talks of the Institute’s ongoing mission 
to help protect the cultural heritage of Morocco. “One recent project,” he relates, “has been 
to compile online lesson plans on ‘How to See in Museums,’ intended for intermediate and 
secondary school teachers in the region.”1  
At first glance, this teaching initiative seems plain wrong, for what could be more 
transparent to the eye than a museum, a primary purpose of which is to exhibit: to hold out 
objects to sight? 2 Graeme Davison underscores this pivotal function of the modern-day 
museum when he takes the Panopticon, a planned but unbuilt eighteenth-century circular 
prison with a glass surveillance tower at its centre, and compares it to a precursor of the 
modern-day museum. The precursor in question is London’s Great Exhibition of 1851, which 
was housed in transparency itself: the purpose-built Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. Davison 
remarks: “The Panopticon was designed so that everyone could be seen; the Crystal Palace 
was designed so that everyone could see.”3  
                                                 
1. Dale F. Eickelman, “TALIM President’s Newsletter and Year-end Donation Appeal,” TALIM 
President’s Newsletter, December 16, 2017, 2. 
2 . Cf. Paul Basu and Sharon Macdonald, “Introduction: Experiments in Exhibition, 
Ethnography, Art, and Science,” in Exhibition Experiments, ed. idem (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), 2. 
3. Graeme Davison, “Exhibitions,” Australian Cultural History 2 (1982/83): 7, as cited in 
Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics (London: Routledge, 1995), 
65. On the “hand-in-glove” relationship between the world fairs of the nineteenth century 
and the modern museum, see Robert Rydell, “World Fairs and Museums,” in A Companion to 
Museum Studies, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). Most recently, see 
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How one negotiates the culturally coded space of the modern-day museum might need 
the mediating presence of a teacher, a possibility that Carol Duncan has exposed in her 
celebrated book on the art museum as a ritual site.4 The objects exhibited might also be 
deemed in need of pedagogic intervention to render them legible. 5  But seeing in the 
museum is surely immediate, in need of no intervention, for the modern-day museum is 
predicated on sight.  
To be sure, sight’s dominion there has a history, and the museum has a history of 
techniques to facilitate this dominion. 6  Additionally, recent developments in museum 
practices suggest sight’s sovereignty may be giving way to sound and touch. 7  Even so, 
because the museum’s exhibitionary order overlaps with other modern exhibitionary 
orders, each reinforcing the other, sight is not going to be overtaken soon.8 Principal among 
these other orders is the shopping arcade and, especially, the department store, with its 
                                                 
Gudrun König, “Displaying Things: Perspectives from Cultural Anthropology,” in On Display: 
Visual Politics, Material Culture, and Education, ed. Karin Priem and Kerstin te Heesen 
(Münster: Waxmann, 2016). 
4. Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995).  
5. See, e.g., Tracie Costantino, “Teacher as Mediator: A Teacher’s Influence on Students’ 
Experiences Visiting an Art Museum,” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 42, no. 4 (2008). 
On legibility itself, see Tony Bennett, “Speaking to the Eyes: Museums, Legibility and the 
Social Order,” in The Politics of Display: Museums, Science, Culture, ed. Sharon Macdonald 
(London: Routledge, 1998). 
6. Tony Bennett, “Civic Seeing: Museums and the Organization of Vision,” in A Companion to 
Museum Studies, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 263-81. 
7. Bennett, “Civic Seeing,” 267; Sally Promey, “Foreword: Museums, Religion, and Notions of 
Modernity,” in Religion in Museums: Global and Multidisciplinary Dimensions, ed. Gretchen 
Buggeln et al. (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), xxii.  
8. Cf. Bennett, “Civic Seeing,” 279. 
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encyclopaedic range of products on display in carefully curated vitrines.9 As Gudrun König 
notes: “The association between the museum and the department store, trumpeted as a post-
modern phenomenon, [is] a relationship with a long history.”10 
What is Eickelman talking about, then, when he speaks of learning how to see in the 
museum? To answer this question means asking if the sight the museum facilitates is 
culturally and historically specific. If it is, one might indeed need to learn how to see there if 
one were from a culture with only a limited history of museums; for example, the Arab Gulf 
States, with their rapid development of state-sponsored museums commencing in the 
1970s.11 
It is exactly this question of museum vision that is addressed in the present essay. It is 
my contention that a very specific type of sight is promoted in the modern-day museum that 
is at odds with, and even defies, quotidian ways of seeing in Islamic lands. As I shall contend, 
this sight, or “museological gaze” cannot register the peripheral, penumbral dimensions of 
seeing in Islamic lands. It cannot accommodate, I shall argue, a visuality sutured by worldly 
and otherworldly invisibility; by, for example, the jinn of the natural world and the evil eye 
(al-ʿayn) of the supernatural world. For all its powers of penetration, and perhaps because 
of them, the museological gaze is insensitive to Islamic visuality, seeing through its shadows. 
As I shall demonstrate, it cannot account for a dimension of the Islamic cosmos that defines 
the realm of Islam writ large, namely, the invisible, divine world: the world of the unseen 
(ʿalam al-ghayb).  
                                                 
9. See, inter alia, Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 10-11; Nigel Whiteley, “High Art and the High Street: The ‘Commerce-and-
Culture’ Debate,” in The Authority of the Consumer, ed. Russell Keat et al. (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1994), 110-11; and Neil Cummings and Marysia Lewandowska, The Value of 
Things (Basel: Birkhaüser, 2000), passim. 
10. König, “Displaying Things,” 43. 




The argument is not that Islamic material culture on display in museums represents 
the evil eye, the jinn, and the unseen, and that this representation does not somehow register 
in the museological gaze. Rather, the argument is first that the visuality this material culture 
indexes is incompletely present in this gaze; and second that the index itself, the material 
culture, becomes present in a different way before this gaze. The representational system of 
the modern-day museum presents the index afresh: it represents it. For all that a museum 
might claim that it has on exhibition this or that never-seen-before artifact from this or that 
distant land, what one sees in the museum is the artifact’s representation as a museum 
object, not the thing itself. As W.J.T. Mitchell notes regarding this distinction between an 
object and a thing: “Objects are the way things appear to a subject – that is, with a name, an 
identity, a gestalt or stereotypical template, a description, a use or function, a history, a 
science. Things, on the other hand [signal] the moment when the object becomes the Other, 
when the sardine can looks back, when the mute idol speaks, when the subject experiences 
the object as uncanny […].”12 Museological representation is one of the ways that things 
become objects. 
This museological representation has nothing to do with the meta-level questions of 
representation that the modern-day museum is perennially engaged with: how and why an 
artifact is selected for display and the choices that are made regarding, say, the lighting of 
that display. It has to do with something more fundamental: the transformation of the artifact 
by what Svetlana Alpers calls the museum effect, or “the tendency to isolate something from 
its world, to offer it up for attentive looking and thus to transform it into art like our own.”13 
                                                 
12 . W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 156-7. 
13. Svetlana Alpers, “The Museum as a Way of Seeing,” in Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics 
and Politics of Museum Display, ed. Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 27. Cf. “The act of collecting and exhibiting artifacts, of 
passing them across an exhibitionary threshold, is much more than an act of removal from 
some prior place, context, or condition. The object is not simply transported but 
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The museum effect, Alpers argues, leads to this default condition: “It is to ourselves […] that 
we are representing things in museums.”14  
Does this museum effect matter? That depends on who we are. It might matter if we 
were, say, secular Europeans and wanted our audience to include more Muslim Europeans.15 
Whoever we are, the effect could certainly benefit from unpacking; hence the timeliness, not 
to mention the correctness, of Eickelman’s pedagogical initiative. 
 
Islamic visuality 
 The term “visuality”’ is first found in the work of Thomas Carlyle (d. 1881).16 It has 
sometimes been used by Islamic art historians, but without their giving a definition.17 In one 
                                                 
transformed.” Donald Preziosi, “Art History and Museology: Rendering the Visible Legible,” 
in A Companion to Museum Studies, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 50 
(italics as marked in the original). 
14. Alpers, “The Museum as a Way of Seeing,” 32.  
15. Figures produced at the start of the twenty-first century regarding the interest of British 
Muslims in visiting British museums with permanent displays of Islamic material culture 
make for sombre reading. See Ian Heath, “The Representation of Islam in British Museums,” 
2 vols (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2004), 2: 628-9. Although the author of these 
statistics subsequently published his (downloadable) dissertation, the book does not appear 
to include all the figures. Even so, see Ian Heath, The Representation of Islam in British 
Museums (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2007), 116-17.  
16. Alexa Sand, “Visuality,” Studies in Iconography 33 (2012): 89. 
17. See, e.g., Christiane Gruber and Sune Haugbolle, “Introduction: Visual Culture in the 
Modern Middle East,” in Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image, ed. 
eadem (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), ix-xi, xxiii; and Laura Marks, “The 
Taming of the Haptic Space, from Málaga to Valencia to Florence”, Muqarnas 32 (2015): 253-
7. I, too, use the term in the proceedings of a conference of 2009, and although I define it 
there, my understanding of visuality has developed since. See Simon O’Meara, “Muslim 
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or two of these usages, it would seem to be a synonym of the term “visual culture,” a parallel 
that would echo the usage of one of the foremost students and theorists of visuality, the 
aforementioned W.J.T. Mitchell.18 This leaves us, then, with the meaning of visual culture. 
As explained by Mitchell, the study of visual culture is the equivalent of “ordinary 
language philosophy [in that] it looks at the strange things we do while looking, gazing, 
showing and showing off, such as hiding, dissembling, and refusing to look.”19 For Mitchell, 
this explanation means at least two things. First, that the study of visual culture, what is often 
called visual studies, 20  entails, inter alia, “a meditation on blindness, the invisible, the 
unseen, the unseeable, and the overlooked.”21 Second, that this study cannot be limited to 
the “study of images or media, but extends to everyday practices of seeing and showing, 
especially those that we take to be immediate or unmediated.”22 Attempting to encapsulate 
this capacious field of study, Mitchell offers the chiastic aphorism that visual studies has for 
its object of study the social construction of the visual field and the visual construction of the 
social field.23 Visuality and visual culture are the two interchangeable names for this object 
of study; Islamic visuality and Islamic visual culture, the names for when the object pertains 
                                                 
Visuality and the Visibility of Paradise and the World,” in Roads to Paradise: Eschatology and 
Concepts of the Hereafter in Islam, ed. Sebastian Günther and Todd Lawson, 2 vols (Leiden: 
Brill, 2017), 555-6. 
18. W.J.T. Mitchell, “Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture,” Journal of Visual Culture 1, 
no. 2 (2002): 166-7. 
19. Mitchell, “Showing Seeing,” 178. 
20. See James Elkins, Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction (London: Intellect, 2003), 1-
30. 
21. Mitchell, “Showing Seeing,” 170. 
22. Ibid., 170. 
23. Ibid., 171. By the second part of the aphorism, he means: “It is not just that we see the 
way we do because we are social animals, but also that our social arrangements take the 
forms they do because we are seeing animals.” Ibid. 
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to Islam. Because it names this object of study, there is no plural: there are not Islamic 
visualities, for example, which is not to say that the visuality in question cannot comprise a 
number of different, historical scopic regimes. For example, the visuality of the modern West 
is substantially informed by the scopic regime that Martin Jay calls “Cartesian 
perspectivalism” (because it derives from the quattrocento invention of linear perspective), 
but it is not reducible to this regime.24 An equivalent regime informing Islamic visuality 
would be the concept of modesty (ḥayāʾ).25 Scopic regimes such as these act on the human 
organism’s physiological drive to see: its scopic drive. 
 
Islamic visuality and the world of the unseen 
It is debatable whether the aforementioned evil eye constitutes an historical and thus 
mutable scopic regime of Islamic visuality or is a hard-wired part of it. That it might be the 
latter is because of the awesome power ascribed to it. The Prophet, for example, is alleged to 
have said that the evil eye was as strong as death itself, with the ability to outstrip divine 
destiny, or fate (qadar). 26  This unearthly potency would suggest that the evil eye was 
                                                 
24. Martin Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity,” in Vision and Visuality, ed. Hal Foster (Seattle: 
Bay Press, 1988), passim. 
25. See, e.g., Ze’ev Maghen, “See No Evil: Morality and Methodology in Ibn al-Qattan al-Fasi’s 
Ahkam al-nazar bi-hassat al-basar,” Islamic Law and Society 14, no. 3 (2007): 342–90; and 
Simon O’Meara, Space and Muslim Urban Life: At the Limits of the Labyrinth of Fez 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 49-56. 
26. E.g., “After natural causes, the evil eye is the greatest cause of death in my community” 
(Akthar man yamutu min ummati baʿda qadaʾ Allah wa qadarihi bi-l-anfus. Qala al-rawi: Yaʿni 
al-ʿayn); and “Were anything to outstrip (sabaqa) destiny, it would be the evil eye.” Ibn Hajar 
al-ʿAsqalani, Fath al-bari fi sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. ʿAbd Allah b. Baz and 
Muhammad Fuʾad ʿAbd al-Baqi, 15 vols (Cairo: Dar Misr li-l-Tibaʿa, 2001), 10: 287 (kitab al-
tibb, bab al-ʿayn haqq, #5740); and Abu al-Husayn b. al-Hajjaj Muslim, Sahih Muslim bi-sharh 
al-Nawawi, ed. ʿIssam al-Sababti et al., 11 vols (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1994), 7: 425 (kitab al-
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related to the world of the unseen, which in turn would suggest that it formed the immutable 
core of Islamic visuality; for as Shahab Ahmed has so persuasively argued, to be Muslim – to 
be Islamic – is to be in continuous engagement with the world of the unseen.27  
As an aside, the following interpolation by a nineteenth-century Muslim translator of a 
French book on the “customs and mores of nations” is indicative of the place of the evil eye 
in Islamic visuality and suggestive of how this visuality is the opposite of modern Western 
visuality. In the French book, there is a sentence on the Middle Eastern belief in the evil eye, 
which reads as follows: “Throughout the Orient, the people fear what they call the evil eye.”28 
The translator rendered the sentence as: “One of the beliefs (ʿaqaʾid) of the Europeans is that 
the evil eye has no effect.”29 Having lived in Europe for five years, the Middle Eastern Muslim 
translator well knew that the Europeans recognised the evil eye as much as they recognised 
the jinn. Neither phenomenon registered in their sight. 
Just as the evil eye’s relationship to the world of the unseen is uncertain, so too is the 
jinn’s relationship to that world. This is because although the Quran implies that with the 
coming of Islam no more can the jinn “steal the hearing” from heaven (Q 15:18, 72:8), it also 
says that they try to linger at heaven’s boundary, straining to hear the “high assembly” (Q 
37:8, 72:9). The occasional snatching of divine secrets would therefore seem to be a 
possibility still open to them, something the Quran appears to confirm (Q 26:221-2).30 This 
                                                 
salam, bab al-tibb wa al-marad wa al-ruqa, #2188), respectively. 
27. Shahab Ahmed, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), 345-8. 
28. Georges-Bernard Depping, Aperçu historique sur les mœurs et coutumes des nations 
(Paris: Aux bureaux de l’Encyclopédie Portative, 1826), 189. 
29 . Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi, Qalaʾid al-mafakhir fi gharib ʿawaʾid al-awaʾil wa al-awakhir 
(Bulaq: Dar al-Tibaʿa al-ʿAmira, 1833), 86. 
30. Cf. Gerald Hawting, “Eavesdropping on the Heavenly Assembly and the Protection of the 
Revelation from Demonic Corruption,” in Self-Referentiality in the Qurʾān, ed. Stefan Wild 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), 27. Note, however, the following encyclopaedia 
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possibility is borne out in the popular imagination, where by and large the jinn retain their 
pre-Islamic status as beings capable of accessing the unseen world, and even being of it.31  
For present purposes, whether or not the jinn belong to the world of the unseen is not 
of importance. What matters, rather, is the jinn’s ability to appear and disappear from sight, 
to transform from seen to unseen beings; for this ability visually replicates what divides the 
seen from the unseen world. This ability is important, for the following reason.  
In her book on the jinn, Amira El-Zein argues that these feared beings are intermediary 
beings, because they perpetually traverse the divide between the seen and the unseen 
worlds. This divide, she blankly asserts, is the basis of “the whole of Islam.”32 Given the 
signal importance of this divide in the thought of the aforementioned Shahab Ahmed, 
specifically as expressed in his posthumous publication What is Islam?, El-Zein’s assertion is 
not unreasonable. 33 Recently, another scholar, Amira Mittermaier, has effectively asked 
scholars to be like the jinn, challenging them to traverse the divide between the seen and the 
unseen worlds so as to read Islamic culture through the lens of the unseen (al-ghayb) and to 
write from its place.34 Al-ghayb, Mittermaier explains, should be understood not just as an 
ontological zone, but as a “site of epistemological reflection [because it] presupposes a 
particular attitude and relationship to the world, in which the very condition of not-knowing 
                                                 
entry in which that possibility is excluded: Jacqueline Chabbi, art. “Jinn,” in Encyclopaedia of 
the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe, 6 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2001-6), 3: 43, 46. 
31. See, e.g., Constance Padwick, Notes on the Jinn and the Ghoul in the Peasant Mind of 
Lower Egypt, BSOAS 3, no. 3 (1924): 428. Much more recently, see Stefania Pandolfo, Knot 
of the Soul: Madness, Psychoanalysis, Islam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2018), 90-8, 
269; and Amira Mittermaier, “The Unknown in the Egyptian Uprising: Towards an 
Anthropology of al-Ghayb,” Contemporary Islam 13, no. 1 (2019): 21-2. 
32 . Amira El-Zein, Islam, Arabs, and Intelligent World of the Jinn (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2009), xviii. 
33. Ahmed, What is Islam?, 343-86, esp. 377 ff. 
34. Mittermaier, “The Unknown in the Egyptian Uprising,” 2, 14. 
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is the foundation not only of faith but also of any knowledge.”35 As such, she provocatively 
concludes, scholars of the Islamic world should in turn try to build a knowledge of their 
subjects from a place of al-ghayb. 36  With specific reference to the subject of Islamic 
anthropology, she says: “[Writing from a place of al-ghayb] means asking not simply how to 
do an anthropology of the invisible but also how al-ghayb can inflect anthropology.”37  
In the section that follows below, I tentatively and very provisionally take up 
Mittermaier’s challenge for the subject of Islamic art history, including its public face, the 
Islamic art museum, by engaging with the jinn as a proxy for al-ghayb. 
 
Dis/appearing jinn 
In the Quran, the Earth is effectively split into two domains, that of humankind and that 
of the jinn; numerous are the verses in which God simultaneously addresses both categories 
of sublunary created beings.38 The two domains are not, however, sealed off from each 
other, such that humans can, mostly inadvertently and unwillingly, enter the jinn’s domain 
and the jinn can, less inadvertently and unwillingly, enter the humans’.39 With the exception 
of certain extraordinary individuals and the rarest of instances, the jinn are invisible to 
humans; they can, however, assume the form of an animal or even a human, and in that way 
appear and disappear before our very eyes.40 This means that Islamic visuality is not just 
fundamentally informed by invisibility, in that, as per Shahab Ahmed, Islam is structured by 
the divide between the seen and unseen worlds of the Islamic cosmos; but more mundanely 
and equally quranically, Islamic visuality is riddled by dis/appearance. For 
                                                 
35. Ibid., 4. 
36. Ibid., 13-14. 
37. Ibid., 14. 
38. Chabbi, “Jinn,” 46. 
39. Ibid., 44 
40. The literature on this subject is vast, but for an introduction, see El-Zein, Intelligent 
World of the Jinn, 22-6, 89-120. 
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phenomenologically speaking, the jinn are dis/appearance itself. “Appearance,” writes 
Heidegger, “does not mean that something shows itself; rather it means that something 
which does not show itself announces itself through something that does show itself.”41  
If in modern Western visuality, the phenomenon of dis/appearance is accounted for by 
the history of art – an art of appearance since the quattrocento until the rise of abstraction 
in the twentieth century42 – the same is not true in Islamic visuality. For Islamic art is only 
exceptionally about appearance; only rarely is it about optical naturalism. 43  In Islamic 
                                                 
41. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 
28. 
42. See, e.g., the words of the expressionist painter Ernst Kirchner (d. 1938), for example: “A 
painter paints the appearance of things, not their objective correctness, in fact he creates 
new appearances of things.” Cited in Norbert Wolf, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner 1880-1938: On 
the Edge of the Abyss of Time, trans. John William Gabriel (Cologne: Taschen, 2003), 14. See, 
too, the words of Merleau-Ponty regarding Cézanne (d. 1906): “[Cézanne condensed into 
visible objects] the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things.” Cited in Galen 
Johnson, “The Invisible and the Unrepresentable: Barnett Newman’s Abstract Expressionism 
and the Aesthetics of Merleau-Ponty,” Analecta Husserliana 75 (2002): 183. How appearance 
is understood, either as an optically registered, surface phenomenon that is seen solely in 
the presence of light or as something prototypical and more profound that is not seen solely 
in light, is a key distinction between modern (quattrocento and later) and medieval Western 
visuality. On this distinction, see Jack Greenstein, “On Alberti’s ‘Sign’: Vision and Composition 
in Quattrocento Painting,” The Art Bulletin 79, no. 4 (1997): 669-98. As John Berger notes 
regarding the former (modern) visuality: “All drawing is a shadow around light.” Idem, The 
Shape of a Pocket (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), 145. In this same modern visuality, as Henri 
Bergson observed, there is no distinction between perception and the thing perceived. Idem, 
Matière et mémoire, 26th ed. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1929), 200. 
43. Notwithstanding the factual errors Hans Belting introduces into his analysis of Islamic 
theories of vision, specifically Ibn al-Haytham’s (d. ca. 1040), and ignoring the predictably 
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visuality, the phenomenon of dis/appearance is accounted for by the jinn. To display Islamic 
art as if it were, in Alpers’s words, an “art like our own,” namely, an optically naturalistic 
depiction of the appearing, physical world, and to do so without bringing into the picture the 
jinn, is to transform Islamic art, exactly as she says. Not only does the Islamic world comprise 
the jinn, but Islamic art rarely depicts the world.  
 
Glass boxes 
At the heart of the problem of the display of Islamic art in the modern-day museum is 
the fact that the museological gaze is part and parcel of modern Western visuality, not 
Islamic visuality, as I shall explain below. Stickers almost need to be affixed to the display 
cases to announce the fact, in the same way that stickers are often affixed to plate glass 
windows and doors to prevent people walking into them. Doing so would not constitute a 
                                                 
territorial and ungracious treatment meted out to it by certain Islamic art historians, in my 
view his counterposition of (predominantly anti-naturalistic) Islamic art and (naturalistic) 
quattrocento art is provocative and stimulating. See Hans Belting, Florence and Baghdad: 
Renaissance Art and Arab Science, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), passim. Key aspects of Belting’s book as 
they pertain to the present essay are contained in summary form in Hans Belting, “The 
Double Perspective: Arab Mathematics and Renaissance Art,” Third Text 24, no. 5 (2010). Is 
A. Mark Smith correct when he asserts that Ibn al-Haytham’s theory of vision was, pace 
Belting, “profoundly iconic”? Did not Joel Snyder get the matter correct decades ago when he 
said that retinal impressions were first understood iconically – as pictures, not as forms (sg. 
eidos) – in quattrocento Europe by Alberti (d. 1472), and that this understanding led to the 
invention of linear perspective or at least to its mathematical codification via the science of 
optics? See A. Mark Smith, “Review of Hans Belting, Florence and Baghdad: Renaissance Art 
and Arab Science (2011),” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 56 




pointless joke, because the display cases contribute to the creation of the museological gaze. 
As noted by Khadija von Zinnenburg Carroll: “The glass between the artefact and the viewer 
is the [gaze’s] epistemic membrane crystallized around an object.”44  
The display cases might even be what create the gaze. As the same author writes 
elsewhere: “Built within the very architecture of the museum, vitrines are a structure of 
thinking. That structure frames any subject and object that enter the space but typically 
remains unanalyzed despite its effect on the formation of the ideas on display.”45 According 
to this argument, the display box acts like a lens, of the same order as a microscope, 
telescope, or camera. The lens establishes both the subject, who holds the lens, and the 
object, which is scrutinised through the lens.  
The argument is not hyperbolic. Lewis Mumford, for example, considers that early-
modern European developments in glass-making, coupled with the widespread introduction 
of transparent glass these developments led to, gave birth to the modern scientific world.46 
                                                 
44. Khadija von Zinnenburg Carroll, “The Inbetweenness of the Vitrine: Three Parerga of a 
Feather Headdress,” in The Inbetweenness of Things: Materializing Mediation and 
Movement Between Worlds, ed. Paul Basu (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 24. 
45. Khadija von Zinnenburg Carroll, “Vitrinendenken: Vectors between Subject and Object,” 
in The Challenge of the Object: Congress of the International Committee of the History of Art, 
ed. G. Ulrich Großmann and Petra Krutisch (Nuremberg: Verlag des Germanischen 
Nationalmuseums, 2013), 318.   
46. “[Transparent] glass helped put the world in a frame: it made it possible to see certain 
elements of reality more clearly; and it focussed attention on a sharply defined field – 
namely, that which was bounded by the frame. […] [With the invention of the telescope and 
compound microscope] the naive conceptions of space that the ordinary man carried around 
were completely upset: one might say that these two inventions, in terms of the new 
perspective, extended the vanishing point toward infinity and increased almost infinitely the 
plane of the foreground from which those lines had their point of origin.” Lewis Mumford, 
Technics and Civilization (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1934), 125-6. Cf. John 
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He even lists the plate glass window alongside the microscope and telescope: one of the 
panoply of dioptric instruments invented in this period. 47  Others have interpreted 
woodcuts by Dürer (d. 1528) showing the use of just such dioptric instruments as an 
encapsulation of the scientific method itself, namely, the establishment of an object over 
which a subject stands in unblinking scrutiny (fig. 1). 
 
 
FIG. 1 HERE – full page, if possible 
Fig. 1: Woodcut illustrations of draughtsmen making linear perspective drawings of a vase and a 
reclining nude, from Albrecht Dürer (d. 1528), Underweysung der Messung (Instruction in 
Measurement) (Nüremburg, 1538). Page dimensions: 31.9 x 21.5 cm. Courtesy: The Metropolitan 




In the top woodcut, we see an artist using an eyepiece and a pane of transparent glass 
to create a linear perspective drawing of a vase. In the bottom woodcut, we see an artist using 
an eye-pointer and a pane of gridded but otherwise transparent glass to create a linear 
perspective drawing of a reclining nude, up whose parted thighs he stares. Regarding this 
bottom woodcut, inter alia, this interpretation has followed: the objectification of 
woman/nature by the male artist/scientist subject via his framed, instrumentalised, 
penetrative sight.48 
                                                 
Onians, European Art: A Neuroarthistory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 269. 
47 . Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 180-1 (fig. 2). Cf. Anne Friedberg, The Virtual 
Window: From Alberti to Microsoft (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 110. For a 
more dispassionate account of the importance of early-modern developments in glass-
making for lens-based science, see A. Mark Smith, From Sight to Light: The Passage from 
Ancient to Modern Optics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), 325-6. 
48 . See especially, Lynda Nead, Female Nude: Art, Obscenity, and Sexuality (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1992), 11; but also Allen Dunn, “The Pleasures of the Text: Volatile Visuality,” 





It is no coincidence that the glass-wielding artists in Dürer’s two woodcuts are making 
linear perspective drawings. As Samuel Edgerton asserts in his book, The Mirror, the 
Window, and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear Perspective Changed Our Vision of the 
Universe: “No rocket ship to the moon could ever have been invented, let alone be built and 
function, without the humble heritage of Renaissance linear perspective.” 49  Although 
Edgerton’s assertion sounds exaggerated, there is no shortage of similar assertions by other 
scholars that could replace it.50 For example, reworking a phrase coined by the philosopher 
of science Alexandre Koyré, Bryan Wootton refers to linear perspective’s invention as the 
beginning of the “mathematization of the world,” and thus the seed of the scientific 
revolution and origin of the modern world.51 
                                                 
Secrets of Vision in Renaissance England,” in The Treatise on Perspective: Published and 
Unpublished, ed. Lyle Massey (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 2003), 328-9. That 
the gridded frame contains transparent glass is specified in Anderson, “The Secrets of 
Vision,” 329. Others have supposed the frame to be unglazed. See, e.g., Friedberg, The Virtual 
Window, 39. For an analysis of the historical development of these woodcuts, including the 
suggestion that the lower woodcut may not by Dürer, see Noam Andrews, “Albrecht Dürer’s 
Personal Underweysung der Messung,” Word & Image 32, no. 4 (2016): 421-4. 
49. Samuel Edgerton, The Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear 
Perspective Changed Our Vision of the Universe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 
171. 
50. E.g. “Renaissance artists’ interest in perspective reflects the emergence at this time of 
modern science itself.” Fred Kleiner, Gardner’s Art Through the Ages: A Concise Western 
History, 4th ed. (Boston: Cengage, 2007), 232. 
51. Brian Wootton, The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 200. Karsten Harries makes a similar argument in 
idem, Infinity and Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001), 14-16. 
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In view of these assertions, we should take seriously Donald Preziosi’s claim about the 
representational logic of the modern-day museum and its museological gaze. “Museums,” he 
says, “put us in the picture, by teaching us how to appear picture-perfect.”52 The reason we 
should take it seriously is because our being in the picture is also the effect of linear 
perspective. The linear perspective painting is an extension of our own space: we are the 
subject of it, paradoxically constructed by it. In the words of Norman Bryson, linear 
perspective “is a personal construction, where the image recognises (more accurately, 
constructs) the viewer as a unitary subject, master of the prospect, unique possessor of the 
scene.”53 In Preziosi’s claim, the modern museum acts similarly, recomposing the fractured 
identity of the modern subject into a coherent picture. As he explains his claim: 
 
[The museum is a place that enables the] modern social subject to be constituted as an 
anamorphosis of the bits and pieces of its own life and experience: a place from which 
to view those bits in such a way as to realign them in a (previously hidden or invisible) 
order, a “story” that makes a certain sense. […] What the museum subject “sees” in this 
remarkable institutional space is a series of “mirrors” – possible ways in which it can 
construct or compose its life as one or another kind of centered unity or consistency 
which draws together in a decorous and telling order its sundry devices and desires.54 
 
For all that the museum is about the objects it exhibits and archives, it is also all about 
me. As when viewing a linear perspective painting, in the museum I stand tangible, corporeal, 
and whole: possessing, and possessed by, a world of absolute visibility.55 This world is no 
world of the jinn, fleeting shadows of dis/appearance. As Christian Suhr has argued 
                                                 
52. Preziosi, “Art History and Museology,” 53. 
53. Norman Bryson, Tradition and Desire: From David to Delacroix (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 77 (italics as marked in the original). 
54. Preziosi, “Art History and Museology,” 53. 
55 . Cf. Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1983), 106. See also below. 
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regarding the ultimate dioptric instrument of linear perspective construction, the camera, 
the jinn are outside of the picture.56  
Next, when I step outside the museum, not only do I find its world of absolute visibility 
reinforced by that of the department store and shopping arcade, as mentioned earlier, but 
also by that of the city as a whole. Exactly as Middle Eastern visitors to the world fairs of 
nineteenth-century Europe also experienced, there seems to be no outside to the 
exhibitionary order of the museum, because the city replicates it.57 The city, too, is arranged 
for my view, as a picture. The arrangement speaks of an urban practice whose origins date 
to trecento Italy, specifically Florence and its new satellite towns. As Marvin Trachtenberg 
says of this period of Florentine history in his award-winning book The Dominion of the Eye:  
 
[T]recento painters shared with urban planners an intense engagement with the 
observer, with controlling the location and angle of vision and coordinating what is 
seen with where it is ideally seen from. This scopic desire led to the devising, 
respectively, of illusionistic and real spatial structures that fixed the ideal viewing point 
of both painting and monumental architecture, sometimes with extraordinary 
precision. Both media solicited the ambulatory viewer’s immobility at a particular 
station, where the spatially structured and structuring pictorial and scenographic 
image was ideally to be sensorially produced and visually consumed. Whether this new 
experience was essentially “pictorial” or “architectural” is rather moot.58  
 
Trachtenberg argues that the quattrocento invention of linear perspective in Florence 
was dependent on the trecento city’s incipient early-modern visuality, and that the historical 
linkage between the two is provided by Brunelleschi’s (d. 1446) lost perspective-
demonstration panels. Those panels are said to have represented two of the city’s principal 
                                                 
56. Christian Suhr, “The Failed Image and the Possessed: Examples of Invisibility in Visual  
Anthropology and Islam,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society 21, no. 1 (2015): 109. 
On the direct connection between linear perspective painting and the camera, and thence 
photography, see Snyder, “Picturing Vision,” passim. 
57. Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 5-12. 
58. Marvin Trachtenberg, Dominion of the Eye: Urbanism, Art, and Power in Early Modern 
Florence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 181-4. 
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monuments, the Palazzo Vecchio and Baptistery, both built or reworked according to the 
principles of trecento urbanism. As such, Trachtenberg argues, the panels tie trecento 
visuality to the quattrocento invention of linear perspective and further cement the bond 
between urbanism and painting initiated in the trecento.59 
For Trachtenberg, the Panopticon-like visuality that the trecento gave rise to was 
deliberately produced and reproduced by the Florentine state as an instrument of 
authority.60 It is not hard to see its apotheosis in Baron Haussmann’s redevelopment of 
Paris in the mid-nineteenth-century. 61 Although the following eye-witness account by a 
Tunisian visitor to Haussmann’s Paris refers to the experience of seeing a photographic 
panorama of the redeveloped city at the Paris world fair of 1889, not the city itself, the 
visitor’s words are nonetheless revealing: “No different from reality [...] the observer sees 
himself at the centre (fi wasat) of the city, surrounded by its buildings, streets, and 
gardens.” 61F62  
Haussmann’s Paris epitomised modernity. The replication of aspects of its precisely 
regimented space was thus not infrequently sought by Muslim states wishing to display their 
modern credentials.63 But the visuality this exported space belonged to was at a marked 
                                                 
59. Trachtenberg, Dominion of the Eye, 52-4; and more concisely in idem, “A Question of 
Origins,” The Art Bulletin 84, no. 4 (2002). 
60. Trachtenberg, Dominion of the Eye, 260. 
61. For a history of the intervening centuries regarding the role of perspective in urban 
design, see Leonardo Benevelo, The European City, trans. Carl Ipsen (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), 124-71. 
62. Muhammad b. ʿUthman al-Sanusi, Istitlaʿat al-barisiyya fi maʿrid 1889 (Tunis: n.a., 1891), 
242. 
63. See, e.g., Robert McChesney, “Architecture and Narrative: The Khwaja Abu Nasr Parsa 
Shrine. Part 2: Representing the Complex in Word and Image, 1696-1998,” Muqarnas 19 
(2002): 88; and Nezar AlSayyad, Cairo: Histories of a City (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 206-12. 
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variance to the visuality it was imported into. This is because, for the most part, medieval 
and premodern Islamic urbanism eschews pictorially ordered public space. 64  On the 
occasions where something approaching pictorial public space is found in the Islamic 
context, as for example at the royal square of Safavid Isfahan, these represent the exception, 
not the rule. In the words of D. Fairchild Ruggles:  
 
The opening up of space to allow long sight lines and sweeping views was more 
dramatic in the medieval Islamic context than a modern reader might initially realize. 
In the medieval environment, walls, doors, screens, and veils curtailed vision at every 
pass. Houses were not to be seen, except in a controlled manner by selected individuals 
and at select time; bodies were not to be seen, again except for a few individuals under 
controlled circumstances; and even in the supposedly public spaces of the city […] 
there were few occasions when long-range views encompassing large spaces and many 
people were possible. […] Vision was a tightly controlled experience; it had social 
power and as such was not available to more than a small group of people […].65 
 
Against this Islamic urban background, it is hardly surprising that the aforementioned 
Middle Eastern visitors to the world fairs of Europe found the cities there astonishing in their 
pictoriality, or intizam al-manzar (literally, organisation of the view).66 The reverse was no 
less true for the same period’s European visitors to the Middle East. They found the Islamic 
medinas incomprehensible and impenetrable, and lamented their lack of a “point of view,” 
or linear perspectival ordering principle. 67  Only by heading for elevations beyond the 
perimeter walls could these Europeans see them as they wanted: as pictures.68 
 
                                                 
64. I address this subject in more detail in Simon O’Meara, “Haptic Vision: Making Surface 
Sense of Islamic Material Culture,” in The Routledge Handbook of Sensory Archaeology, ed. 
Robin Skeates and Jo Day (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2019), 906–33. 
65. D. Fairchild Ruggles, Gardens, Landscape, and Vision in the Palaces of Islamic Spain 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 107. 
66. Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 12-13. 
67. Ibid., 21-6. 




The gradual demise of the department store and shopping arcade in the twentieth-first 
century city has not ended the reciprocal relationship between the modern-day museum and 
the city. As public space in cities inexorably succumbs to what is called “brand urbanism,” or 
the co-opting of this space by a corporate revisioning of it, so in many ways Apple Inc. leads 
the way with its iconic glass storefronts. First among these storefronts is the cubical one on 
Fifth Avenue, New York. But what is this structure, if not a museum vitrine writ large? It is a 
display case, albeit one wherein the item exhibited is not an Apple product but the Apple 
logo itself, the company’s merchandise having been relocated to the store proper, below 
ground.69  
In the light of the connections this essay has drawn between the early modern and 
modern history of Western urbanism, the department store, and the museum, it might strike 
the reader as odd to learn that this Apple storefront in downtown New York, this “temple of 
consumerism,” was originally mistaken by some Muslims as a copy of the Kaaba and a 
mockery of Islam. The problem was the black cladding temporarily used to protect the glass 
during the storefront’s construction in late 2006. For with the cladding on, there was indeed 
a resemblance between the under-construction building and the Kaaba in Mecca. That 
resemblance led to an online outcry.70 
I have written about this outcry elsewhere; for present purposes, what is interesting 
about the virtual storm the storefront occasioned is the fact that Apple’s cube and Mecca’s 
                                                 
69. For a finely nuanced discussion of what else this storefront is, including its connection to 
London’s 1851 Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace, see Sarah Lookofsky, “Cults of 
Transparency: The Curtain Wall and the Shop Window in the Work of Dan Graham and 
Josephine Meckseper,” in Sculpture and the Vitrine, ed. John Welchman (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2016). 
70. See Simon O’Meara, “The Kaaba of New York,” in Taking Offense: Religion, Art, and Visual 




Kaaba belong to opposing visualities. Indeed, a case could be made that these visualities are 
diametrically opposite, such that perceiving the Kaaba in the storefront could hardly have 
been more wrong and yet also hardly more correct, because the two visualities form the two 
sides of the same coin. My reasoning is twofold:  
1) As the point to which every Muslim is instructed to turn and face (Q 2:144), the 
Kaaba is where sight ends. Sight vanishes in the Kaaba. The same is true of linear perspective, 
the mathematical systemisation of optical sight that is involved in the visual organisation of 
early modern and modern Western urbanism, including New York and Apple’s glass box 
therein. At the point called the vanishing point, which anchors this system, sight disappears.  
2) As the point in Islamic creation myth from which the world is said to have been born, 
the Kaaba is not just the Islamic world’s axis mundi, but also its matrix mundi.71 The same 
is true of the vanishing point: from this point the modern scientific world was born, exactly 
as noted by Courbet (d. 1877) in his version of the Creation myth, L’Origine du monde.72 
                                                 
71. See Simon O’Meara, “Mecca and other Cosmological Centres in the Sufi Universe,” in 
Handbook of Sufi Studies. Vol. 2: Sufi Cosmology, ed. Christian Lange and Alexander Knysh 
(Leiden: Brill, forthcoming 2020).  
72. As John Onians has recently shown, it is a mistake to view this painting as some kind of 
male locker-room joke, especially as Courbet made a number of “source” paintings, only one 
of which involved the female genitalia. See Onians, European Art, 311-12. Additionally, this 
particular source painting that shows a mostly disembodied “cosmic” vagina is preceded by 
some 150 years by a Tibetan Buddhist fresco of the same subject, except that in the fresco 
the vagina is totally disembodied and painted without regard for optical naturalism. See Ian 
Baker, The Dalai Lama’s Secret Temple: Tantric Wall Paintings from Tibet (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 2000), 64-5. As Paola Uparella and Carlos Jáuregui have even more recently 
shown, Courbet’s painting is also preceded by a European Enlightenment tradition of 
anatomical representations of the female genitalia and uterus. This tradition reduces the 
female body “to a pelvic body, with no arms, legs, or head,” exactly as Courbet’s painting does. 
See Paola Uparella and Carlos Jáuregui, “The Vagina and the Eye of Power (Essay on Genitalia 
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Courbet’s infamous painting is, of course, not itself the birthplace of this scientific world, but 
its title names it and its irreligiously frank, objectifying and, to some, phallocentric and 
exploitative viewpoint reveals its site-cum-sight (ur-sites constructing their sight).73 From 
this site, in this sight, with this viewpoint, nature is open to examination. Dürer’s woodcut of 
the reclining nude does something similar, albeit more coyly: the draughtsman possesses the 
objectifying viewpoint, not the viewer, who, as an extension of the draughtsman, possesses 
it at one remove only.74 The viewpoint of Courbet’s painting and the embedded viewpoint 
of Dürer’s woodcut reveal the sight of the modern scientific world. The linear perspectival 
construction of both pictures speaks of this sight’s site: the vanishing point outside of the 
view, which anchors the view, establishes the viewpoint, and owns the viewer who possesses 
this viewpoint.75 In Bryson’s words once more: “[T]he vanishing point is the anchor of a 
                                                 
and Visual Sovereignty),” H-ART: Revista de historia, teoría y crítica de arte 3 (2018): 90. 
Courbet’s painting is thus not idiosyncratic, but belongs to what Uparella and Jáuregui call a 
“gyneco-scopic regime.” Ibid., 81. With thanks to Jonathan Bloom for alerting me to this 
article, and to John Gibson and Christian Luczanits for their help with the Tibetan fresco. 
73. On ur-sites and sight, see Mark Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s 
Haunt (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), 61. Cf. the development of Wigley’s 
argument in O’Meara, “The Kaaba of New York,” 147-52. On the painting’s phallocentric and 
exploitative viewpoint, see Uparella and Jáuregui, “The Vagina and the Eye of Power,” 82 ff. 
74. On the identification of the viewer with the draughtsman, see Bryan Wolf, “Confessions 
of a Closet Ekphrastic: Literature, Painting and Other Unnatural Relations,” Yale Journal of 
Criticism 3 (1990): 196-7. 
75. The paradoxical reversibility of the vanishing point and viewpoint is explained by Bryson 
as follows: “[The] vanishing point marks the installation within the painting of a principle of 
radical alterity, since its gaze returns that of the viewer as its own object: something is 
looking at my looking: a gaze whose position I can never occupy, and whose vista I can 
imagine only by reversing my own, by inverting the perspective before me, and by imagining 
my own gaze as the new, palindromic point of disappearance on the horizon.” Bryson, Vision 
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system which incarnates the viewer, renders him tangible and corporeal [as] a measurable, 
and above all a visible object in a world of absolute visibility.”76  
“If we look closely,” writes Baudrillard with reference to the thought of Hannah Arendt, 
“we see that the real world begins, in the modern age, with […] the invention of an 
Archimedean point outside the world (on the basis of the invention of the telescope by 
Galileo and the discovery of modern mathematical calculation).”77 What Baudrillard calls 
“the discovery of modern mathematical calculation” was made possible by the arrival into 
medieval Europe of the meta-sign zero. 78  In linear perspectival constructions, a visual 
version of this meta-sign, visual zero, is the equivalent of what Baudrillard calls the 
“Archimedean point.” 79  There is every reason to think that the Kaaba is this point’s 
architectural equivalent: a tectonic zero, anchoring the symbolic order of Islam.80 
                                                 
and Painting, 107. On the basis of this paradox, it follows that “the epoch of the vanishing 
point [is] the transformation of the subject into object.” Ibid. See also Bryson, Tradition and 
Desire, 220 n. 15. 
76. Bryson, Vision and Painting, 106 (italics as marked in the original).  
77 . Jean Baudrillard, Why Hasn’t Everything Already Disappeared?, trans. Chris Turner 
(London: Seagull Books, 2009), 10. 
78. See, e.g., Robert Kaplan, The Nothing That Is: A Natural History of Zero (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 106 ff.; and Charles Seife, Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea 
(London: Penguin Books, 2000), 78 ff. On zero as a meta-sign, or a “sign-about-signs outside 
it,” see Brian Rotman, Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1987), 13. 
79. Rotman, Signifying Nothing, 13-22. 
80. This is a subject I pursue in my forthcoming monograph on the Kaaba. For present 
purposes, I refer the reader to Michel Chodkiewicz’s description of the Kaaba as “a zero point 
in time [and] space,” in idem, “Toward Reading the Futuhat Makkiya,” in 
The Meccan Revelations: Ibn al-ʿArabi, ed. idem, trans. William Chittick et al., 2 vols (New 
York: Pir Press, 2002-4), 2: 23. 
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These foregoing commonalities between the Kaaba and the Apple storefront are also 
what divide the visualities each represents. As noted earlier, the Kaaba belongs to a visuality 
sutured by divinely proclaimed invisibility, al-ghayb; the storefront, to a visuality that 
aspires to total transparency and absolute visibility. Both visualities can exist side by side in 
the same geographical location without that fact posing a logical contradiction; 
contemporary Mecca, with its high-rise hotels surrounding and dwarfing the Kaaba, is a case 
in point. In the modern-day museum, however, only the latter visuality obtains. Recognising 
that situation – teaching it – is the start of undoing it. 
 
Conclusion 
As desirable as it would be to conclude this essay knowing how to see the jinn in the 
modern-day museum, such a result was only ever very distantly on the horizon, the essay’s 
title notwithstanding. The matter is beyond complex, and presumably for many if not most 
Muslims, also unnerving, with the goal unwelcome because frightening. The goal of the essay 
has realistically only ever been about establishing why it was necessary to create the 
conditions for the display of Islamic art so that the jinn could in principle be seen in the 
museum, so that the jinn and the unseen world, the ʿalam al-ghayb, had a place there. 
To be absolutely explicit, there is nothing wrong with the display of Islamic art in the 
museum as it currently stands. However, at a moment of academia when decolonising 
scholarship is high on the agenda, asking how better to display art that belongs to non-
Western visualities is a worthwhile question. Prescient as ever, Dale Eickelman has led us to 
this question. We now need some answers. With regard to Islamic art, my sense is that one 
answer will concern the fact that looking through windows onto carefully calibrated views, 
the principal activity of visitors in front of museum vitrines, was something only for the 
powerful and patriarchal in medieval and premodern Islamic urban culture. The open (but 
unglazed) windows they looked through formed part of pictorially organised views.81 For 
                                                 
81. See Felix Arnold, Islamic Palace Architecture in the Western Mediterranean: A History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 36-121. 
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most other people, however, open windows at body height were rarely encountered, being 
generally screened. These screened windows did not allow looking through, but at best 
peering through, and were not part of pictorially organised views. As Fairchild Ruggles has 
noted, they additionally made one self-conscious about the act of looking itself: in 
confounding vision, they teased and drew attention to the eye.82 The shadowy fissures the 
screens threw across sight are reminiscent of the jinn lurking in the shadowlands between 
visibility and invisibility.  
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